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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 27 No. 8 2014

Do Lenders Still Monitor When They Can Securitize Loans?

Yihui Wang1; Han Xia2

1 Chinese University of Hong Kong · 2 The University of Texas at Dallas

Abstract

We examine how securitization markets affect the role of banks as monitors in corporate lending. We find that banks active in securitization impose looser covenants on borrowers at origination. After origination, these borrowers take on substantially more risk than do borrowers of non-securitization-active banks. We use borrowers' geographic locations to instrument for borrower-lender matching to distinguish the effect of securitization on the banks' ex post monitoring from its effect on ex ante screening. We further investigate direct evidence of banks' monitoring role by examining their actions following covenant violations and find that securitization-active lenders are more likely to grant waivers without changing loan terms. Our results suggest that banks exert less effort on ex post monitoring when they can securitize loans.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhu006
Volume
27
Issue
8
Pages
2354-2391
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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