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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 37 No. 3 2024

The Cost of Bank Regulatory Capital

Matthew Plosser1; João A. C. Santos1,2

1 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, USA · 2 Nova School of Business and Economics , Portugal

open access

Abstract

Basel I introduced capital requirements for undrawn commitments, but only for revolvers with an original maturity greater than one year. We use this regulatory discontinuity to estimate the impact of capital regulation on the cost and composition of credit. Following Basel I, short-term commitment fees declined relative to long-term commitments and issuance of short-term facilities increased. Our results highlight the sensitivity of credit provision to capital regulation, particularly for banks with less capital. We are able to infer that low-capital banks are willing to forego twice as much income from fees to reduce required regulatory capital by a dollar.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhad077
Volume
37
Issue
3
Pages
685-726
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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