← Search

Review of Financial Studies Vol. 37 No. 8 2024

A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards

Michael J. Fishman1; Jonathan A. Parker2; Ludwig Straub3

1 Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University , USA · 2 Sloan School of Management, MIT , USA and NBER · 3 Harvard , USA and NBER

open access

Abstract

We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks’ incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhae010
Volume
37
Issue
8
Pages
2355-2402
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite