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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 34 No. 5 2021

The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation

Rustom M. Irani1; Rajkamal Iyer2; Ralf R. Meisenzahl3; José-Luis Peydró4

1 University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign · 2 Imperial College London · 3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago · 4 Imperial College London, ICREA-UPF-CREI-BarcelonaGSE, CEPR

open access

Abstract

We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce, and nonbanks step in. This reallocation is associated with important adverse effects during the 2008 crisis: loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities are less likely to be rolled over and experience greater price volatility.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhaa106
Volume
34
Issue
5
Pages
2181-2235
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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