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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 35 No. 12 2022

Insurers as Asset Managers and Systemic Risk

Andrew Ellul1; Chotibhak Jotikasthira2; Anastasia V. Kartasheva3; Christian Lundblad4; Wolf Wagner5

1 Indiana University , CSEF, CEPR and ECGI, USA · 2 Southern Methodist University , USA · 3 University of St.Gallen , Switzerland · 4 University of North Carolina , Chapel Hill, USA · 5 Rotterdam School of Management and CEPR , the Netherlands

Abstract

Financial intermediaries often provide guarantees resembling out-of-the-money put options, exposing them to undiversifiable tail risk. We present a model in the context of the U.S. life insurance industry in which the regulatory framework incentivizes value-maximizing insurers to hedge variable annuity (VA) guarantees, though imperfectly, and shifts risks into high-risk and illiquid bonds. We calibrate the model to insurer-level data and identify the VA-induced changes in insurers’ risk exposures. In the event of major asset and guarantee shocks and absent regulatory intervention, these shared exposures exacerbate system-wide fire sales to maintain capital ratios, plausibly erasing over half of insurers’ equity capital.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhac056
Volume
35
Issue
12
Pages
5483-5534
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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