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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 32 No. 12 2019

Cancellable Insider Trading Plans

Stephen L. Lenkey

Abstract

[Rule 10b5-1 enables insiders to preplan future trades before becoming informed. Within a strategic rational expectations equilibrium framework, I characterize an insider’s unique optimal trading plan, which balances portfolio diversification against exploitation of the rule’s selective termination option. Because the rule reduces adverse selection and provides insurance against bad outcomes, the rule generally improves welfare for both the insider, who later becomes informed, and uninformed outsiders, provided there exists a sufficient degree of information asymmetry. Eliminating the rule’s selective termination option results in an even greater welfare improvement under a large subset of parametric conditions.]

Volume
32
Issue
12
Pages
4947-4996
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib

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