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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 35 No. 4 2022

Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry

Mara Faccio1; Luigi Zingales2

1 Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, NBER, ABFER, and ECGI · 2 Booth School of Business, The University of Chicago, NBER, and CEPR

Abstract

We study the relationship between the presence of politicians on mobile service operators’ boards and the regulation of the mobile telecommunication sector. In countries in which mobile operators have deeper connections with local politicians, we find that rules promote competition less, even after we control for country fixed effects and a country’s level of corruption. Rules that promote competition are associated with lower concentration and lower prices. There is no evidence that procompetition rules are associated with worse quality, lower investments, less employment, or lower wages. Thus, all the evidence points to political connections being a form of rent-seeking.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhab074
Volume
35
Issue
4
Pages
1983-2018
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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