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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 35 No. 4 2022

Director Appointments: It Is Who You Know

Jay Cai1; Tu Nguyen2; Ralph Walkling3

1 The LeBow College of Business, Drexel University · 2 School of Accounting and Finance; University of Waterloo · 3 Ohio State University and Drexel University

Abstract

Using 9,801 director appointments during 2003–2014, we document the dramatic impact of connections. Sixty-nine percent of new directors have professional ties to incumbent boards, a group representing 13% of all potential candidates. Consistent with facilitating coordination and reducing search costs, connections help boards bring in gender diversity, new skills, and new industry background. More complex firms and firms in more competitive environments tend to appoint connected directors and experience better market reactions and higher shareholder votes. Connections to incumbent CEOs, however, result in lower announcement returns and shareholder votes. We use death (merger)-induced network loss (gain) as instruments.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhab064
Volume
35
Issue
4
Pages
1933-1982
Language
en
Sources
crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex

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