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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 27 No. 10 2014

Complex Securities and Underwriter Reputation: Do Reputable Underwriters Produce Better Securities?

John M. Griffin; Richard Lowery; Alessio Saretto

Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that high-reputation banks will generally produce good securities to maintain their long-run reputation. We show with a simple model that, when securities are complex a high-reputation bank may produce assets that underperform during market downturns. We examine this possibility using a unique sample of $10.1 trillion of CLO, MBS, ABS, and CDOs. Contrary to the conventional view, securities issued by more reputable banks did not outperform but, rather, had higher proportions of capital in default.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhu030
Volume
27
Issue
10
Pages
2872-2925
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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