Academy of Management Review Vol. 30 No. 2 2005
Deregulatory Forms, Variations in the Speed of Governance Adaptation, and Firm Performance
Abstract
Government regulation in an industry is an intermediary in the principal-agent relationship that acts as a substitute for internal governance mechanisms. We propose a model for studying how different forms of deregulation (frame-breaking, metamorphic, piecemeal, and plodding) impact variations in the speed of adaptation of internal governance mechanisms to the theoretical predictions of agency theory and resulting performance implications. We develop illustrative propositions for a set of contingencies that moderate the above relationship. How government and firms manage the deregulatory process has important economic and social consequences.
- DOI
- 10.5465/amr.2005.16387896
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 414-425
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex ris:amr.ris crossref