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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 38 No. 1 2003

Corporate Governance and the Home Bias

Magnus Dahlquist; Lee Pinkowitz1,2,3; René M. Stulz1,2,3; Rohan Williamson3,1,2; René M. Stulz3,1,2

1 The Ohio State University · 2 National Bureau of Economic Research · 3 Georgetown University

Abstract

In most countries, many of the largest corporations are controlled by large shareholders.We show that, under reasonable assumptions, this stylized fact implies that portfolio holdings of U.S. investors should exhibit a home bias in equilibrium.We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders.This available world portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio.In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world portfolio of available shares has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power.This result holds when we control for country characteristics.

DOI
10.2307/4126765
Volume
38
Issue
1
Pages
87
Sources
openalex crossref

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