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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 54 No. 5 2019

Bank Interventions and Trade Credit: Evidence from Debt Covenant Violations

Zilong Zhang

Abstract

This study examines the consequences of conflicts between creditors. Using the setting of debt covenant violations, I employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of banks’ interventions on their borrowers’ trade credit. The results show that trade credit experiences a substantial decline when banks intervene in the borrowing firm following covenant violations. The decline is mitigated by the presence of dependent suppliers and exacerbated by banks’ incentives to exercise control rights. Such externalities are reflected in the loan-contract design. Borrowing firms sign less restrictive loan contracts when they rely more on trade credit or trade creditors.

DOI
10.1017/s0022109018001163
Volume
54
Issue
5
Pages
2179-2207
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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