Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 22 No. 3 1987

Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance

Tim S. Campbell^1,2; William A. Kracaw³

¹ University of Southern California · ² California Southern University · ³ Finance

Abstract

Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw, Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 315-328

DOI

10.2307/2330966

Volume

22

Issue

3

Pages

315

Sources

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