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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 61 No. 4 2026

Do Shareholder Leverage Constraints Affect Debtholders?

Xiaoran Huang1; Massimo Massa2; Lei Zhang3

1 Xiamen University School of Economics WISE · 2 INSEAD Finance Department · 3 City University of Hong Kong College of Business Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract

We examine the relationship between shareholder leverage constraints and corporate risk-taking, focusing on its impact on debtholders. Our findings show that mutual fund leverage constraints are related to more risk-taking activities of portfolio companies, inducing higher credit risk and greater risk-shifting concerns for the firms’ debtholders. In response, the debtholders raise borrowing costs and tighten lending conditions. These effects intensify for firms facing higher levels of conflict between debtholders and shareholders and when mutual funds exert greater influence over firms. Econometric analyses, including instrumental variable specifications and asset management company mergers, support a causal interpretation.

DOI
10.1017/s0022109025102317
Volume
61
Issue
4
Pages
2033-2072
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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