← Search

Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 109 2019

Bank management expertise and asset securitization policies

Tsung-Kang Chen1; Hsien-Hsing Liao2; Jing-Syuan Ye3

1 National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University · 2 National Taiwan University · 3 Fu Jen Catholic University

Abstract

We explore how the expertise of a bank holding company's management team affects its asset securitization policies. We find management team members with an MBA degree and top management experience securitize more low risk loans while those with core functional executive positions securitize fewer high risk loans. In addition, internal liquidity, governance quality, and risk management quality moderate these effects. Moreover, risk management concerns are the main driver of the negative effect of the percentage of core functional executives on asset securitization. We also provide evidence that core functional executives deem securitized mortgage loans riskier after the subprime crisis.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.105667
Volume
109
Pages
105667
Language
en
Sources
semanticscholar openalex crossref

Cite