Journal of Finance Vol. 48 No. 2 1993

Incentive Conflicts, Bundling Claims, and the Interaction among Financial Claimants

Chester S. Spatt^1,2; Frederic P. Sterbenz

¹ U.S. National Science Foundation · ² University of Illinois Chicago

Abstract

We show that for certain capital structures equity has an incentive to buy out another claim and alter the firm's investment strategy so as to maximize the combined value of equity and the acquired claim. This restructuring may reintroduce agency problems into capital structures which appear to avoid agency conflicts. By bundling claims, it is possible to avoid this agency problem. The agency problem is also eliminated by dispersed ownership of the claims.

DOI

10.2307/2328910

Volume

48

Issue

2

Pages

513

Sources

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