Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets

Darrell Duffie; Nicolae Gârleanu; Lasse Heje Pedersen

doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm037

Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets

Darrell Duffie^1,2; Nicolae Gârleanu^1,3,4; Lasse Heje Pedersen⁵

¹ National Bureau of Economic Research · ² Stanford University · ³ Centre for Economic Policy Research · ⁴ University of California, Berkeley · ⁵ Capital University

Review of Financial Studies 2007 open access

We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions, illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility, or hedging demand is larger. Supply shocks cause prices to jump, and then “recover” over time, with a time signature that is exaggerated by search frictions: The price jump is larger and the recovery is slower in less liquid markets. We discuss a variety of empirical implications.

DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm037
Volume: 20 (6)
Pages: 1865-1900
Language: en
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