Review of Financial Studies Vol. 28 No. 6 2015
The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?
open access
Abstract
We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.
- DOI
- 10.1093/rfs/hhu147
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1701-1736
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref