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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 21 No. 2 2008

Strategic Alliances and the Boundaries of the Firm

David T. Robinson

Duke University

Abstract

Strategic alliances are long-term contracts between legally distinct organizations that provide for sharing the costs and benefits of a mutually beneficial activity. In this paper, I develop and test a model that helps explain why firms sometimes prefer alliances over internally organized projects. I introduce managerial effort into a model of internal capital markets and show how strategic alliances help overcome incentive problems that arise when headquarters cannot pre-commit to particular capital allocations. The model generates a number of implications, which I test using a large sample of alliance transactions in conjunction with Compustat data. , Oxford University Press.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhm084
Volume
21
Issue
2
Pages
649-681
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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