Ownership: Evolution and Regulation

Julian Franks; Colin Mayer; Stefano Rossi

doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn108

Ownership: Evolution and Regulation

Julian Franks¹; Colin Mayer^2,3; Stefano Rossi⁴

¹ London Business School · ² Center for Economic and Policy Research · ³ University of Oxford · ⁴ Stockholm School of Economics

Review of Financial Studies 2009 open access

This article is the first study of long-run evolution of investor protection and corporate ownership in the United Kingdom over the twentieth century. Formal investor protection emerged only in the second half of the century. We assess the influence of investor protection on ownership by comparing cross-sections of firms at different times in the century and the evolution of firms incorporating at different stages of the century. Investor protection had little impact on dispersion of ownership: even in the absence of investor protection, rates of dispersion of ownership were high, associated primarily with mergers. Preliminary evidence suggests that ownership dispersion in the United Kingdom relied more on informal relations of trust than on formal investor protection.

DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn108
Volume: 22 (10)
Pages: 4009-4056
Language: en
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