Review of Financial Studies Vol. 30 No. 12 2017
Authority, Consensus, and Governance
Abstract
Management-aligned boards exchange precise information with management and make efficient decisions. But when agency conflicts are important, management-aligned boards may not maximize shareholder value. Even if management controls all decisions and the board only provides advice, optimal boards may withhold information. This creates inefficiencies. But agency costs fall because management is induced to obey the board. When the board can directly veto management proposals, shareholders are better off. Optimal boards should then be more shareholder-aligned. Shareholder value is further enhanced if shareholders can veto management and also commit to revealing the board’s information. Optimal boards should then be perfectly shareholder-aligned. Received September 26, 2015; editorial decision December 18, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.
- DOI
- 10.1093/rfs/hhx068
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 4267-4316
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref