← Search

Review of Financial Studies Vol. 32 No. 12 2019

Strategic Liquidity Mismatch and Financial Sector Stability

André F. Silva

Federal Reserve Board

Abstract

This paper examines whether banks strategically incorporate their competitors’ liquidity mismatch policies when determining their own and the impact of these collective decisions on financial stability. Using a novel identification strategy exploiting the presence of partially overlapping peer groups, I show that banks’ liquidity transformation activity is driven by that of their peers. These correlated decisions are concentrated on the asset side of riskier banks and are asymmetric, with mimicking occurring only when competitors take more risk. Accordingly, this strategic behavior increases banks’ default risk and overall systemic risk, highlighting the importance of regulating liquidity risk from a macroprudential perspective. ReceivedMay 4, 2016; editorial decision January 1, 2019 by Editor Philip Strahan.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhz044
Volume
32
Issue
12
Pages
4696-4733
Language
en
Sources
crossref openalex

Cite