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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 32 No. 11 2019

Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk

Rui Albuquerque1; Luís Cabral2; José Guedes3

1 Boston College · 2 New York University · 3 Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics

Abstract

We show that, in the presence of correlated investment opportunities across firms, risk sharing between firm shareholders and firm managers leads to compensation contracts that include relative performance evaluation. These contracts bias investment choices toward correlated investment opportunities, and thus create systemic risk. Furthermore, we show that leverage amplifies all such effects. In the context of the banking industry, we analyze recent policy recommendations for firm managerial pay and show how shareholders optimally undo the policies’ intended effects. Received October 31, 2017; editorial decision August 21, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhz028
Volume
32
Issue
11
Pages
4304-4342
Language
en
Sources
crossref openalex

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