Shareholder-Value Maximization and Product-Market Competition
Review of Financial Studies
1990
open access
We investigate product-market competition when managers maximize shareholder value rather than their expected discounted value of profits. If shareholders are imperfectly informed about future profitability, shareholder-value maximization can lead to either more or less aggressive product-market strategies. Lower rivals’ profits lead investors to believe that the firm’s costs are low relative to those of its rivals and that the industry’s prospects are poor. If the former (latter) inference dominates, each firm tries to lower (raise) its rivals’ profits to increase its own stock price. We also consider implications for corporate financial structure.
- DOI
- 10.1093/rfs/3.3.367
- Volume
- 3 (3)
- Pages
- 367-391
- Language
- en
- Export
- BibTeX
- Sources
- openalex crossref