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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 141 No. 3 2021

Who provides liquidity, and when?

Sida Li1; Xin Wang2; Mao Ye3,1

1 University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign · 2 Nanyang Technological University · 3 National Bureau of Economic Research

open access

Abstract

We model competition for liquidity provision between high-frequency traders (HFTs) and slower execution algorithms (EAs) designed to minimize investors’ transaction costs. Under continuous pricing, EAs dominate liquidity provision by using aggressive limit orders to stimulate HFTs’ market orders. Under discrete pricing, HFTs dominate liquidity provision if the bid-ask spread is binding at one tick. If the tick size (minimum price variation) is not binding, EAs choose between stimulating HFTs and providing liquidity to non-HFTs. Transaction costs increase with the tick size but can be negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread when all traders can provide liquidity.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.04.020
Volume
141
Issue
3
Pages
968-980
Language
en
Sources
semanticscholar openalex crossref

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