The Accounting Review Vol. 58 No. 4 1983
The Effects of Job Standard Tightness and Compensation Scheme on Performance: An Exploration of Linkages.
Abstract
This study explores the linkages among job standard tightness, type of compensation scheme, and performance. It postulates that job standard tightness and type of compensation scheme affect not only workers' effort, but also their self-selection among employment contracts, and through these, job performance. A laboratory experiment yielded the following results: among subjects with assigned treatments, job standard tightness and type of compensation scheme had significant independent, but insignificant interactive effects on performance. Subjects who were permitted to choose their own compensation schemes (given an assigned job standard) self-selected among these by skill. There was also some indication that being able to select one's own compensation scheme, per se, enhanced performance. If supported by future studies, these results suggest that job standards and compensation schemes may affect performance not just by motivating a given set of employees, but also by affecting the type of employees an organization attracts from the labor market.
- DOI
- 10.2308/tar-4483031
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 667-685
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref