A Cooperative Formulation of the Audit Choice Problem.

Joel S. Demski; Robert J. Swieringa

doi:10.2308/tar-4514931

A Cooperative Formulation of the Audit Choice Problem.

Joel S. Demski¹; Robert J. Swieringa²

¹ Professor of Information and Accounting Systems, Stanford University. 1 · ² Assistant Professor of Accounting, Stanford University 2

The Accounting Review 1974

This article presents a study on a cooperative formulation of the audit choice problem in auditing in the U.S. Under appropriate conditions, this leads to group level surrogate utility and probability functions such that the audit program chosen should maximize expected surrogate utility. Thus, the auditing problem is conceptually reduced to a Bayesian decision problem. The normative utility function, however, is determined by summing the auditee's and auditor's respective risk tolerances; and the probability function is determined by sampling both individuals' opinions in proportion to their marginal stake in the choice consequence. That is, the appropriate functions are composites and are not, in the general case, those of the auditors.

DOI: 10.2308/tar-4514931
Volume: 49 (3)
Pages: 506-513
Language: en
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