The Accounting Review Vol. 56 No. 4 1981
Coalition Formation in the APB and the FASB: Some Evidence on the Size Principle.
Abstract
The objective of this study is to investigate the applicability of the size principle, which predicts a tendency to minimum winning coalitions, to political processes in accounting standard formulation. Actual winning coalitions in the APB and FASB are found to be significantly larger than minimum winning, leading to a consideration of the assumptions underlying the size principle. Two alternative hypotheses, the "information effect" and the "threat effect," are examined. Evidence regarding these hypotheses is inconclusive due to the inability to define unambiguously an observed winning coalition for the APB.
- DOI
- 10.2308/tar-4481774
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 897-909
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref openalex