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Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 64 No. 2 2026

Strategic (Inconsistent) Disclosures and Sophisticated Investors: Evidence from Hedge Funds

Yichang Liu1; Joshua Madsen2; Frank Zhou3

1 School of Accountancy Chinese University of Hong Kong · 2 Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota · 3 The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

open access

Abstract

Recent SEC regulations require that qualified hedge fund advisers provide their investors with narrative disclosures of their business and operations. We find that 40% of these disclosures omit or de‐emphasize information regarding advisers' operational and investment risks when compared to other sources of public information. Funds with such “inconsistencies” are associated with predictably lower fund performance but do not differ in their fund flows, flow‐performance relation, ownership structure, or management fees. These results are consistent with investors being subject to limited strategic thinking, which prevents them from fully unraveling the implications of strategic omissions. This, in turn, contributes to advisers' successful use of discretion to de‐emphasize information with adverse performance implications. Our findings suggest that information processing frictions can facilitate nondisclosure, even in markets with sophisticated investors.

DOI
10.1111/1475-679x.70013
Volume
64
Issue
2
Pages
923-978
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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