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Does analyst participation in earnings conference calls curb real activities earnings management?

Yuan Ji¹; Oded Rozenbaum²

¹ The University of Texas at Arlington Arlington Texas USA · ² The George Washington University Washington DC USA

Abstract Sell‐side equity analysts serve as external monitors, yet evidence on how they fulfill this monitoring role remains limited. We examine whether analysts utilize earnings conference calls to monitor firms suspected of real earnings management and assess the implications of such monitoring. Our findings reveal that analysts are more likely to ask about discretionary expenses during conference calls of firms suspected of lowering these expenses to meet or narrowly beat analysts' expectations. These questions are associated with lower subsequent EPS forecast revisions, indicating a potential cost to managers. Moreover, analysts' questions on discretionary expenses to suspect firms are linked to subsequent increases in discretionary expenses and a lower likelihood of meeting or narrowly beating analysts' earnings expectations in the following 2 years. Overall, our results suggest that analysts' active participation in earnings conference calls potentially discourages managers from engaging in real earnings management.

DOI

10.1111/1911-3846.70015

Volume

43 (1)

Pages

169-200

Language

en

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Sources

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