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Creditor control rights and executive bonus plans

Christopher Armstrong^1,2; John D. Kepler^1,2; Chongho Kim³; David Tsui⁴

¹ Palo Alto University · ² Stanford University · ³ Seoul National University · ⁴ Analysis Group (United States)

Abstract We study the extent to which creditors shape the executive bonus plans of their financially distressed borrowers. Financial distress can exacerbate agency conflicts between creditors and borrowers as concerns with underinvestment become more acute due to managerial myopia and debt overhang. Consequently, we expect creditors to exert their influence to ensure that these managers’ incentive-compensation plans encourage longer-term investments and directly reward outcomes that benefit creditors without exposing managers to unnecessary risk. We argue that bonus plans are an especially important way to provide these incentives because their flexibility allows creditors to more precisely target specific investment objectives. We find that borrowers’ bonus plans tend to have longer horizons and more convex payouts following covenant violations, especially when bonus plans can be a particularly effective way to address distress-related agency conflicts. Our evidence suggests that creditors protect their interests by exercising their control rights to shape their borrowers’ incentive-compensation plans.

DOI

10.1007/s11142-025-09876-6

Volume

30 (3)

Pages

2724-2767

Language

en

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