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A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting

James B. Kau; Donald Keenan; Paul H. Rubin

University of Georgia

In this paper we specify a model in which Congressmen, constituents, and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior. Constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of Congressmen; Congressmen, on the other hand, want to be elected and vote accordingly. We empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model. Our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of Congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors. We also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential; unions are more often influential than is business. Ideological factors are also important in explaining voting.

DOI

10.2307/1880758

Volume

97 (2)

Pages

271

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