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The Devolution of Declining Industries

Pankaj Ghemawat1; Barry Nalebuff2

1 Harvard University · 2 Yale University

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1990

In declining industries capacity must be reduced in order to restore profitability. Who bears this burden? Where production is all or nothing, there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium: the largest firms exit first [Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985]. In this paper firms continuously adjust capacity. Again, there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. All else equal, large firms reduce capacity first, and continue to do so until they shrink to the size of their formerly smaller rivals. Intuitively, bigger firms have lower marginal revenue and correspondingly greater incentives to reduce capacity. This prediction is supported by empirical findings.

DOI
10.2307/2937824
Volume
105 (1)
Pages
167
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