Journal of Political Economy Vol. 65 No. 2 1957
An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy
Abstract
IN SPITE of the tremendous importance of government decisions in every phase of economic life, economic theorists have never successfully integrated government with private decision-makers in a single general equilibrium theory. Instead they have treated government action as an exogenous variable, determined by political considerations that lie outside the purview of economics. This view is really a carry-over from the classical premise that the private sector is a self-regulating mechanism and that any government action beyond maintenance of law and order is "interference" with it rather than an intrinsic part of it.2 However, in at least two fields of economic theory, the centrality of government action has forced economists to formulate rules that indicate how government "should" make decisions. Thus in the field of public finance, Hugh Dalton states:
- DOI
- 10.1086/257897
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-150
- Language
- en
- Sources
- semanticscholar openalex crossref