Journal of Political Economy Vol. 101 No. 6 1993
Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market
Abstract
This paper introduces the 'separate spheres' bargaining model, a new model of distribution within marriage. It differs from divorce threat bargaining models in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage; this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles. The predictions of the authors' model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models; in the separate spheres model, cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can--but need not--imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages. In the long run, the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium.
- DOI
- 10.1086/261912
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 988-1010
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref