Journal of Political Economy Vol. 104 No. 1 1996
Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors
Abstract
Within an optimal contracting framework, the authors analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from. They also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern rule renegotiation of debt contracts. The key to the authors' analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default. Debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager's control. The optimal debt structure balances these effects. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.
- DOI
- 10.1086/262015
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-25
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref