An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery
Journal of Political Economy
1985
It is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes. This hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue's server. The Nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are de- rived. It is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed. The model does not have strin- gent informational requirements, and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue. It also suggests a useful auctioning procedure.
- DOI
- 10.1086/261329
- Volume
- 93 (4)
- Pages
- 760-781
- Language
- en
- Export
- BibTeX
- Sources
- crossref openalex