Journal of Political Economy Vol. 100 No. 3 1992
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
Abstract
This paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns--concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation. The authors show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives: the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers. The authors find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market performance.
- DOI
- 10.1086/261826
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 468-505
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref openalex