Journal of Political Economy Vol. 88 No. 3 1980
Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures
Abstract
This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of the competition for procurement contracts under different auction procedures. One procedure is a "discriminatory" auction in which contractors simultaneously submit sealed bids, and the lowest bidder wins. The other procedure is a "competitive" auction in which the bid price is lowered sequentially until only one interested bidder remains. The focus is on the effect of changes in procurement procedures and the number of bidders on expected procurement costs. If bidders in this model are risk averse, then the expected procurement cost is lower in a discrimatory auction than in a competitive auction.
- DOI
- 10.1086/260878
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 433-445
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref