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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 99 No. 5 1991

Specific versus General Enforcement of Law

Steven Shavell

National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

Optimal enforcement of law is examined in a model with specific enforcement effort--effort devoted toward apprehending individuals who have committed a single type of harmful act--and general enforcement effort--effort devoted toward apprehending individuals who have committed any of a range of harmful acts (a police officer on patrol, for instance, is able to apprehend many types of violators of law). If enforcement effort is specific, optimal sanctions are extreme for all acts. If enforcement effort is general, however, optimal sanctions rise with the harmfulness of acts and reach the extreme only for the most harmful acts.

DOI
10.1086/261790
Volume
99
Issue
5
Pages
1088-1108
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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