Journal of Political Economy Vol. 97 No. 1 1989

A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt

Jeremy Bulow^1,2,3; Kenneth Rogoff^1,4,2

¹ National Bureau of Economic Research · ² University of Chicago · ³ Stanford University · ⁴ Harvard University

Abstract

Few sovereign debtors have repudiated their obligations entirely. But despite the significant sanctions at the disposal of lenders, many borrowers have been able to consistently negotiate for reduced repayments. This paper presents a model of the on-going bargaining process that determines repayment levels.

DOI

10.1086/261596

Volume

97

Issue

1

Pages

155-178

Language

en

Sources

openalex crossref

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