Journal of Political Economy Vol. 102 No. 3 1994
Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior
Abstract
Self-reporting --the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority --is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement. Optimal self-reporting schemes are characterized and are shown to offer two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because individuals who are led to report harmful acts need not be identified; risk is reduced because individuals bear certain sanctions when they report their behavior, rather than face uncertain sanctions.
- DOI
- 10.1086/261947
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 583-606
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref