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The Political Economy of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938

Andrew Seltzer

Journal of Political Economy 1995

This paper examines the congressional passage of the American minimum wage law, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Voting on the act is modeled as a function of the concentration of the constituencies for minimum wage legislation, North-South differentials, and legislator ideology. It is shown that the House radically altered the final content of the bill, abandoning a proposed Wages and Hours Board with discretionary powers to determine minimum wages in favor of a flat rate following the objections of several interest groups; North-South divisions over the bill had little influence over congressional voting; and the influence of constituent groups increased relative to legislators' ideology as the bill became an important election issue.

DOI
10.1086/601456
Volume
103 (6)
Pages
1302-1342
Language
en
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