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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 134 No. 3 2026

Automation and Polarization

Daron Acemoglu; Jonas Loebbing1

1 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Abstract

We develop an assignment model of automation. Each of a continuum of tasks of variable complexity is assigned to either capital or one of a continuum of labor skills. We characterize conditions for interior automation, whereby tasks of intermediate complexity are performed by capital. Interior automation arises when low-skill wages are low and effective cost of capital in low-complexity tasks is high. Minimum wages make interior automation less likely. Higher capital productivity causes employment and wage polarization, changes the skill premium nonmonotonically, and reduces the real wage of workers with comparative advantage profiles close to that of capital.

DOI
10.1086/739330
Volume
134
Issue
3
Pages
1017-1072
Language
en
Sources
semanticscholar openalex crossref

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