Journal of Political Economy Vol. 88 No. 3 1980
Person-Specific Information in the Labor Market
Abstract
Heterogeneity on both sides of the labor market implies that the correct matching of individuals to firms is of importance. If there is uncertainty about individual productive characteristics, there are both private and social returns to activities that generate information facilitating the assortative matching process. A model of individual investment in information is presented and analyzed. A key assumption is that there are no individuals who have an absolute advantage in all jobs. Under this assumption, all individuals view more accurate information as beneficial and therefore invest in its production. Comparative statics are derived and the model is compared to human capital and signaling-screening models.
- DOI
- 10.1086/260888
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 578-597
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref