Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match

Avinatan Hassidim; Assaf Romm; Ran I. Shorrer

doi:10.1257/aer.p20171048

Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match

Avinatan Hassidim¹; Assaf Romm²; Ran I. Shorrer³

¹ Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel (e-mail: ) · ² Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, (e-mail: ) · ³ Penn State University, State College, PA 16801 (e-mail: )

American Economic Review 2017

We report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171048
Volume: 107 (5)
Pages: 205-209
Language: en
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