American Economic Review Vol. 107 No. 5 2017

Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments

John William Hatfield¹; Scott Duke Kominers²; Alexander Westkamp³

¹ McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, 2110 Speedway, Austin, TX 78172 (e-mail: ) · ² Society of Fellows, Department of Economics, Center of Mathematical Sciences and Applications, and Center for Research on Computation and Society, Harvard University, and Harvard Business School, Arthur Rock Center for Entrepreneurship, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163 (e-mail: ) · ³ Department of Management, Economics, and Social Sciences, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany (e-mail: )

Abstract

We introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on observable substitutability, we show that multi-division choice functions with flexible allotments enable stable and strategy-proof matching; these results illustrate the value of clearly mapping when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible.

DOI

10.1257/aer.p20171050

Volume

107

Issue

5

Pages

214-219

Language

en

Sources

openalex crossref