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Assortative Matching under Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Malawi

Manuela Angelucci1; Daniel Bennett2

1 Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Lorch Hall, 611 Tappan Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (e-mail: ) · 2 Center for Economic and Social Research, University of Southern California, 635 Downey Way, Los Angeles, CA 90089 (e-mail: )

American Economic Review 2017

Asymmetric information is a key feature of the marriage market. In HIV-endemic settings, HIV risk is an important partner attribute that may influence marriage timing and partner selection. We use a sample of married women in rural Malawi to validate a model of positive assortative matching under asymmetric information. Several correlations support this framework, suggesting that HIV risk contributes to adverse selection in the marriage market in this setting.

DOI
10.1257/aer.p20171055
Volume
107 (5)
Pages
154-157
Language
en
Export
BibTeX
Sources
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