Specifying a Structural Matching Game of Trading Networks with Transferable Utility
American Economic Review
2017
Structural estimation of matching games with transferable utility, including matching games of trading networks and many-to-many matching, is increasingly popular in empirical work. I explore several modeling decisions that need to be made when specifying a structural model for a matching game. One decision is the choice of a game theoretic solution concept to impose in the structural model. I discuss pairwise stability, competitive equilibrium, and noncooperative games such as auctions. Another decision is whether to work with a continuum of agents or a finite number of agents. I explore other issues as well.
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.p20171114
- Volume
- 107 (5)
- Pages
- 256-260
- Language
- en
- Export
- BibTeX
- Sources
- openalex crossref