Benefit Shares and Majority Voting
Abstract
In the burgeoning literature on collective decision making, attention generally has been focused on the public provision of goods in equal quantities to all recipients. As a result, there has been little positive analysis of the effects of differential distribution of the benefits of public activities. This state of affairs contrasts with the more developed literature on the effects of differential distribution of the costs of public activities. By analogy to the tax share concept in the study of cost sharing, this paper examines the effects of differential benefit shares, or of changing benefit shares, on voting behavior at the individual and aggregate level in a majority voting model. Just as the early literature on cost sharing often assumed equal sharing by all and thus the same tax share for all, the assumption of equal quantities for all can be interpreted as equal benefit shares. This equal quantities assumption requires a distinction between production units (the units relevant for production and cost functions) and consumption units (the units relevant for individual preference relations).' This distinction immediately raises the issue of the distribution of public benefits, i.e., the transformation of production units into consuimption units. A benefit share measures the rate at which a production unit is transformed into an individual's consumption units.2 For example, in the case of a pure public good, without exclusion, the benefit shares would all equal unity. The problem this paper is concerned with can now be stated in its simplest form by the following example. Suppose that the state has made private trading in bread illegal. In lieu of market exchange, the government distributes the bread at a zero price, with the cost of the bread met through taxation. The total amount of the bread provided (units in production) is set by a majority vote, while the distribution of bread (units in consumption) is based on a fixed share arrangement. For example, if the total distribution is 100 loaves per week and Joe's benefit share is .02, then he receives 2 loaves per week. If the distribution scheme is changed-the fixed benefit shares are changed-how does this affect the total amount of bread (in production units) that voters will most prefer? On what factors does each voter's demand depend and how do these individual demands aggregate into market level results? Section IA examines the individual choice problem: how does an individual's most preferred public sector size change as his benefit share changes? Buchanan (1968, p. 54) conjectures that an individual with * Assistant professors, department of economics, and research associates, Center for Study of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. We are indebted to the Ford Foundation for financial support of this research. We acknowledge the helpful comments of James Buchanan, Robert Parks and Theodore Bergstrom on earlier drafts of the paper. We are also deeply indebted to our late colleague Winston Bush who helped us launch our joint research. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Southern Economic Association Meetings in Atlanta 1974, and in seminars at the University of Arizona and the University of Illinois. I This distinction is made in Buchanan (1966), further developed in Buchanan (1968, pp. 52-56), and is a major issue in the discussion between Albert Breton and Buchanan (1967). 2 Recent empirical work has explicitly utilized this distinction by assuming equal sharing in the consumption units. For examples of the use of the equal sharing assumption in the recent empirical literature, see Thomas Borcherding and Robert Deacon, Theodore Bergstrom and Robert Goodman, or Robert Spann.
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